Ottawa — When Prime Minister Mark Carney announced that Canada had shortlisted two foreign companies to build a new fleet of submarines, he framed the decision as a matter of geography and responsibility. Canada has the longest coastline in the world, he said, and protecting it—particularly in the rapidly changing Arctic—requires capabilities the country has delayed for decades.

But the timing of the announcement, and the scope of the plan, reflect something more fundamental: a strategic shift toward Arctic defense infrastructure that can operate independently of the United States.

The proposed acquisition—up to 12 conventionally powered submarines capable of extended under-ice operations—would be the largest submarine procurement in Canadian history. Paired with a new over-the-horizon radar system scheduled to begin construction in 2026, the effort signals a long-term move to assert sovereignty in the North without relying on American technology, approval, or command structures.

A Changing Strategic Environment

The shift follows a period of heightened tension over Arctic governance. A U.S. national security strategy released in late 2025 declared Washington’s intent to assert dominance across the Western Hemisphere, including strategic access to Arctic sea lanes. The document emphasized the importance of the Northwest Passage—the route connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through the Canadian Arctic archipelago—and framed unrestricted access as a security necessity.

For decades, the passage has been managed through diplomatic compromise. Under the 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement, the United States agreed to seek Canada’s consent before sending icebreakers through the waterway, without resolving the underlying disagreement over whether the passage constitutes internal Canadian waters or an international strait.

That accommodation is now under strain. American officials increasingly describe the passage as vital to deterring Russia and China, and U.S. policy documents suggest that reliance on Canadian permission is no longer acceptable from Washington’s perspective.

For Ottawa, the implications are clear. “Sovereignty in the Arctic is not theoretical,” a senior Canadian defense official said. “If you are not present, you do not control outcomes.”

Submarines as Sovereignty Tools

At the center of Canada’s response is its submarine program. In August, the government confirmed two finalists: Germany’s Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems and South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean. Both companies offer advanced conventional submarines designed for long-range, low-signature operations.

The requirements are unusually demanding. The vessels must be capable of operating beneath Arctic ice for weeks at a time, with a deployment range of approximately 3,500 nautical miles and covert patrol endurance of up to 21 days. These specifications are designed to allow persistent monitoring of Arctic waters without reliance on U.S. naval support.

The program’s estimated cost ranges from 20 billion to 60 billion Canadian dollars, depending on configuration and domestic industrial participation. Under current projections, the first submarine could be delivered by 2032 if a contract is signed in 2026, with additional vessels arriving annually into the early 2040s.

Once operational, the submarines would patrol the Arctic approaches, monitor traffic through the Northwest Passage, and enforce Canadian maritime claims under national command.

“This is about presence,” said a former Royal Canadian Navy commander. “Submarines are the one asset that allows you to be everywhere and nowhere at the same time.”

Seeing Beyond the Horizon

Submarines are only part of the strategy. Canada is also moving forward with an over-the-horizon radar (OTHR) system capable of detecting aircraft and missile launches up to 3,000 kilometers away—well beyond the line of sight of conventional radar.

Rather than relying on American systems, Canada is partnering with Australia, which has operated a similar network for decades to monitor its vast northern approaches. The technology is proven, but Canada is adapting it to Arctic conditions, including extreme cold, ionospheric variability, and limited infrastructure.

The system will consist of four sites—two transmitters and two receivers—spread across the North. Initial construction is scheduled to begin in the winter of 2026, with early operational capability by 2029 and full coverage in the early 2030s.

Critically, the radar will be built on Canadian soil, operated by Canadian personnel, and controlled under Canadian command. While data sharing with allies is expected, Ottawa will retain authority over access and tasking.

“This is not about excluding the United States,” said a defense analyst in Ottawa. “It’s about ensuring Canada is not blind in its own territory.”

Infrastructure That Endures

The investments extend beyond sensors and platforms. Canada is upgrading Arctic ports, airfields, fuel storage facilities, and search-and-rescue capabilities. It is also procuring polar-orbit communications satellites to address persistent coverage gaps above 70 degrees north latitude, where existing systems are unreliable.

Together, these projects create what planners describe as irreversible capacity. Submarines have service lives of 30 to 40 years. Radar installations are expected to operate for half a century. Once built, such infrastructure becomes a permanent feature of national defense policy.

“This is path dependency by design,” said a former senior official at the Department of National Defence. “Future governments inherit these capabilities, whether they prioritize the Arctic or not.”

Domestic Consensus and Political Momentum

The shift has broad domestic support. Recent polling shows that roughly 80 percent of Canadians believe Arctic sovereignty must be actively exercised to be maintained. Support for major defense spending has increased across regions, including provinces traditionally skeptical of federal military investments.

The political calculus has also changed. Public debate over defense spending has narrowed as concerns about Arctic access, climate change, and great-power competition converge. For the Carney government, the argument is no longer abstract preparedness but immediate necessity.

A Model for Middle Powers?

Canada’s approach is being closely watched by other U.S. allies. By partnering with countries like Australia, Germany, and South Korea, Ottawa is demonstrating how middle powers can build advanced defense capabilities without exclusive dependence on Washington.

The strategy does not reject alliances or cooperation. Canada remains committed to NATO and NORAD modernization. But it does seek leverage—options that allow Ottawa to act independently when interests diverge.

Ironically, analysts note, pressure from Washington may have accelerated this outcome. By emphasizing unilateral access and strategic necessity, U.S. policy has reinforced Canada’s determination to control its own northern approaches.

By the mid-2030s, if current timelines hold, Canada will possess a comprehensive Arctic surveillance and patrol capability unmatched by any country except the United States, Russia, and China. More importantly, it will control that capability itself.

For Ottawa, that is the point. Not dominance, but autonomy—the ability to d