Canada Reopens Its Fighter Jet Decision, Raising Questions About Cost, Control, and Sovereignty

OTTAWA — For most countries, selecting a next-generation fighter jet marks the end of a long and politically bruising process. Contracts are signed, factories begin production, and governments move on. Canada, however, is doing something rare among NATO allies: reopening a decision it once declared final.

In recent weeks, Canadian officials have confirmed they are again evaluating Sweden’s Saab Gripen E fighter jet, even after committing in 2023 to purchase 88 American-made F-35A Lightning II aircraft. The reconsideration has sent ripples through defense circles in Washington, Brussels, and Ottawa, where analysts see the move as more than a procurement dispute. It reflects a broader struggle over cost overruns, industrial control, and how much independence a middle power can realistically exercise in an era of renewed great-power competition.

At the center of the debate is a stark financial reckoning. What began as a projected C$19 billion purchase has grown into a C$27.7 billion commitment, according to a 2025 report by Canada’s Auditor General, Karen Hogan. When long-term sustainment and operating costs are included, the total could approach C$33 billion over the aircraft’s lifespan. The revised figures — widely discussed across U.S. defense media and on platforms such as X — reignited criticism that Canada underestimated the true cost of joining the world’s most complex weapons program.

The numbers alone have forced a political reset. But the debate has expanded beyond budgets to include questions of sovereignty and leverage, particularly as relations between Ottawa and Washington have grown more strained under President Donald Trump’s second administration.

A Political Climate That Changed the Calculation

Defense procurement rarely exists in a vacuum. Since 2024, Canada has faced repeated tariff threats from Washington, public disputes over trade, and inflammatory remarks by Mr. Trump suggesting Canada’s economic future lay closer to U.S. control. While such comments were dismissed by American officials as rhetorical excess, they resonated deeply in Ottawa.

On U.S. cable networks and political podcasts, the fighter jet issue has increasingly been framed as a test case of allied dependence. Commentators on CNN and MSNBC have noted that the F-35 is not merely an aircraft but a tightly controlled ecosystem, managed by the Pentagon’s Joint Program Office. Software updates, mission systems, and long-term upgrades remain under U.S. authority, with source code access restricted to Washington and, uniquely, Israel.

For critics in Canada, that dependence now feels riskier than it once did.

“Defense procurement used to be about capability first,” said one former Canadian defense official, speaking on background. “Now it’s also about who holds the keys twenty years from now.”

Saab’s Alternative — and Its Appeal

Enter Saab.

The Swedish aerospace firm, whose Gripen E lost decisively to the F-35 during Canada’s 2021 competition, has returned with a sharpened pitch. Saab has publicly offered to assemble every aircraft in Canada, transfer full intellectual property rights, and allow Canadian engineers to upgrade and modify the jet without foreign approval. The company estimates the program could support 12,000 or more jobs, a claim that has circulated widely in Canadian political debate and gained traction on U.S. policy platforms like Politico and Defense News.

Saab has also emphasized the Gripen’s Arctic credentials. Designed for operations from dispersed bases and short runways, the aircraft aligns with Canada’s growing focus on Arctic security — a region increasingly contested by Russia and China.

Industry Minister Mélanie Joly has fueled speculation by publicly stating that Canada must demand stronger domestic returns from major defense purchases. Her remarks, echoed in Bloomberg’s defense coverage, signaled that fighter jets are now being evaluated as industrial policy tools as much as military assets.

Capability Gaps and Military Pushback

Yet the renewed interest in the Gripen has exposed a sharp divide between political and military perspectives.

Leaked evaluation documents from Canada’s 2021 competition, published by Radio-Canada in late 2025, showed just how wide the gap was between the two aircraft. On mission effectiveness, the F-35 scored 97 percent, compared with 22 percent for the Gripen E. Overall, the F-35 received 57.1 out of 60 points, while the Gripen earned 19.8.

Senior Royal Canadian Air Force figures have been blunt. Retired Lieutenant General Yvan Blondin warned in interviews shared widely on U.S. defense forums that Canadian pilots could face advanced Russian and Chinese air defenses in Arctic or coalition operations. In such environments, stealth and sensor fusion are not luxuries, he said, but survival tools.

A mixed fleet — a compromise floated by some politicians — has drawn particular criticism. Military planners argue that operating two fighter types would strain training, logistics, and maintenance systems already under pressure from pilot shortages and aging infrastructure.

The Integration Question

Beyond raw performance lies integration. The F-35 is deeply embedded in NORAD, the joint U.S.–Canada air defense system, and in NATO’s evolving command-and-control networks. While the Gripen is fully NATO-compatible, it lacks the same fifth-generation sensor fusion and real-time data sharing that define the F-35’s role in coalition warfare.

American analysts writing for War on the Rocks and Foreign Policy have noted that interoperability is increasingly the currency of modern alliances. From this perspective, Canada’s reconsideration appears less about choosing between aircraft than about renegotiating its place within U.S.-led defense architecture.

Ironically, the Gripen is not free of American influence either. Its General Electric F414 engine is U.S.-made and subject to American export controls. Analysts have pointed out on X that Washington could, in theory, exert pressure through engine approvals just as it can through F-35 software updates.

Industrial Stakes on Both Sides

Canadian industry also has much at stake. More than 110 Canadian firms participate in the global F-35 supply chain, supporting thousands of jobs tied to U.S. defense contracts. Bombardier’s chief executive, Eric Martel, has cautioned publicly that distancing Canada from the F-35 program could jeopardize existing U.S. government agreements — concerns echoed by American aerospace analysts.

This reality complicates any clean break. As one Washington-based defense analyst put it, “There is no such thing as a zero-dependence option in modern military aviation.”

An Unfinished Decision

As of early 2026, Prime Minister Mark Carney’s government remains committed to accepting the first 16 F-35s, already in production, with deliveries expected later this year. The fate of the remaining 72 aircraft is still under review.

Defense officials have signaled that a full withdrawal from the F-35 program is unlikely. Instead, Ottawa appears to be using the Gripen discussions as leverage — a way to extract greater industrial benefits, cost transparency, and long-term assurances from Washington and Lockheed Martin.

Whether that strategy succeeds remains uncertain. But the debate itself has already changed the conversation. In reopening the fighter decision, Canada has forced allies and adversaries alike to confront a question that extends far beyond aircraft specifications: How much autonomy can a middle power realistically claim in a tightly interconnected security order?

For now, the answer remains unresolved — somewhere between stealth and sovereignty, cost and control.