Canada’s Middle-Power Gamble Finds an Ally in Australia

When Mark Carney stood before the World Economic Forum in Davos earlier this month, few expected his speech to amount to more than a familiar exercise in Canadian multilateralism. Markets barely moved. Commentators largely shrugged. To many observers, it sounded like diplomatic rhetoric at a time when great powers still dominate the global system.

That assumption lasted less than two weeks.

On Saturday in Sydney, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced that Mr. Carney would address the Australian Parliament in March, an invitation reserved for foreign leaders whose ideas are considered consequential to national strategy. “I agree with him,” Mr. Albanese said, referring explicitly to Mr. Carney’s Davos argument that middle powers must unite to resist economic coercion by dominant states.

The statement, delivered before cameras of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, landed with unusual force in Ottawa. It was not simply an endorsement. It was a commitment.

In effect, Australia had just transformed Canada’s abstract thesis into a diplomatic alignment. And in doing so, it signaled that the world’s middle powers—long treated as supporting actors in a great-power drama—may be preparing to rewrite the script.

From Speech to Strategy

At Davos, Mr. Carney argued that the rules-based international order no longer functions as advertised. Economic integration, once a stabilizing force, has become a weapon. Tariffs, export controls, and supply-chain choke points are now instruments of political pressure. Middle powers, he warned, face a choice: accept vulnerability or coordinate.

At the time, the remarks were interpreted by much of the financial press as conventional Canadian caution dressed in modern language. But Washington heard something else. Within days, President Trump publicly criticized the speech and renewed threats of tariffs against allies pursuing independent trade strategies—an unusually sharp response to what was ostensibly a non-confrontational address.

That reaction, analysts now suggest, revealed that the message had landed precisely where it was meant to.

“Carney wasn’t asking for permission,” one former U.S. trade official wrote on social media. “He was announcing independence.”

Australia Steps Forward

Australia’s response matters because it shares Canada’s strategic predicament. Both are advanced economies with deep resource endowments, heavy exposure to global trade, and long-standing alliances with the United States. Both have also experienced firsthand how economic dependence can translate into political leverage—whether through American tariffs or Chinese trade restrictions.

In October, Canada and Australia quietly signed an agreement deepening cooperation on critical minerals, a sector central to clean energy, defense technologies, and advanced manufacturing. At the time, the deal attracted little attention outside specialist circles.

In retrospect, it looks like the opening move.

The sequence is striking: a minerals pact in October, a Davos declaration in January, and now a parliamentary address scheduled for March. Diplomats rarely call this coincidence.

“This is coordination, not symbolism,” said one Asia-Pacific policy analyst in Washington. “Parliamentary addresses are where countries test ideas that may become policy.”

The Middle-Power Problem

For decades, the global order has been organized around a simple hierarchy. Great powers set terms; smaller states adapt. Even multilateral forums like the G7 and G20 reflect this imbalance. Middle powers—countries like Canada, Australia, Mexico, Brazil, South Korea, Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey—possess economic weight and regional influence, but little collective agency.

What they have lacked is not capacity, but coordination.

Mr. Carney’s argument challenges the assumption that middle powers must align individually with larger patrons to ensure security and prosperity. Instead, he proposes that they can act together—pooling resources, aligning trade, and building alternative supply chains—to reduce exposure to coercion from any single dominant actor.

The idea has circulated in academic circles for years. What is new is the willingness to say it out loud.

Beyond Canada and Australia

Australia was the first to respond publicly, but not the only one listening. In Mexico City, President Claudia Sheinbaum’s administration expressed appreciation for the Davos message, according to Mexican media. South Korean commentators noted parallels between Canada’s concerns and Seoul’s own vulnerability to trade pressure. In Brazil and Indonesia, policy analysts highlighted the potential for coordination on critical minerals and industrial policy.

On American social media platforms, the reaction was divided. Some commentators dismissed the idea as unrealistic coalition-building among countries with divergent interests. Others warned that Washington risks accelerating exactly the kind of alignment it fears by treating allies as economic subordinates.

“The irony,” one former diplomat wrote on X, “is that U.S. economic pressure is doing more to unite middle powers than any speech ever could.”

The Economics of Independence

The stakes for Canada are concrete. Roughly two-thirds of Canadian exports still flow to the United States, down from nearly three-quarters a decade ago but high enough to create vulnerability. Australia faces a similar concentration risk, though in its case China looms as both major customer and strategic concern.

Diversification is not about replacing one dominant partner with another. It is about creating options.

Middle-power coordination could allow countries to trade more with each other, jointly invest in processing and manufacturing, and reduce reliance on supply chains controlled by great powers. In critical minerals alone, the potential is substantial: Canada’s lithium and nickel, Australia’s rare earths, South Africa’s platinum group metals, Indonesia’s nickel, Brazil’s rare earth deposits.

Individually, none can challenge existing monopolies. Together, they can reshape them.

Domestic Politics, Global Strategy

Critics note that Mr. Carney’s international activism risks overshadowing domestic priorities. That concern is not trivial. Political legitimacy depends on visible benefits at home.

But the distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy is increasingly artificial. Trade diversification affects jobs. Resource partnerships affect industrial strategy. Diplomatic credibility affects market access.

“The international work is domestic policy by other means,” said a senior Canadian economist. “The challenge is making that connection clear to voters.”

A Test Case in March

Mr. Carney’s address to the Australian Parliament will be closely watched—not for rhetoric, but for substance. Will it outline concrete mechanisms for cooperation? Will it propose institutional structures beyond bilateral deals? Will it hint at a broader forum for middle-power coordination?

Some analysts have floated the idea of a formal grouping—sometimes dubbed an “M50”—designed explicitly for middle powers. Whether that materializes remains uncertain. Coordination among dozens of countries with diverse interests is notoriously difficult.

But so, once, was the idea that Canada would openly challenge American economic dominance—and that Australia would publicly endorse the effort.

An Order in Motion

Global realignments rarely announce themselves with treaties or declarations. They begin with speeches that are dismissed, alliances that seem modest, and decisions that appear reversible.

Then patterns emerge.

What happened between Davos and Sydney suggests that something is shifting. Not a collapse of great powers, but a refusal by middle ones to remain passive.

Whether this moment becomes a turning point or a footnote will depend on what follows. For now, the message is unmistakable: the era of middle-power quietism may be ending. And Canada, unexpectedly, is helping to lead the way.